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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals Supreme Court has jurisdiction over 
the instant appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (e) . 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES / STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the State's evidence at trial was sufficient to 
establish, as an integral element of the charged crimes, defendant's 
ownership of the subject property beyond a reasonable doubt. When 
reviewing a claim of insufficiency of the evidence in a bench trial, 
the appellate court applies the "clearly erroneous" standard, "which 
4 
requires that 'if the findings (or the trial court's verdict in a 
criminal case) are against the clear weight of the evidence, or if 
the appellate court otherwise reaches a definite and firm conviction 
that a mistake has been made, the findings (or verdict) will be set 
aside.'" State v. Featherson, 781 P.2d 424, 431-32 (Utah 1989) 
(quoting State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987)); Provo City 
Corp. v. Spotts, 861 P.2 437 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) . Notwithstanding 
the foregoing, the appellate court has the ultimate power to conduct 
an independent review of constitutional claims such as the issue in 
this case concerning the standard of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt 
as required by the constitutional right to due process. See State v. 
Thurman, 846 P. 2d 1256, 1266 (Utah 1993) . Although considerable 
deference is accorded to factual findings, the trial court's 
conclusion of law that ownership by Defendant of the subject property 
was proven beyond a reasonable doubt is given no special deference 
and thus reviewed for correctness. See State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 
93 9 (Utah 1994) . Trial counsel preserved this issue, as well as 
subsidiary issues, by moving to dismiss after the State's case-in-
chief (R. 162-63, Transcript of Trial). 
2. Whether the trial court, by failing to rule on the pending 
motions before it on temporary remand from this Court, erred by 
failing to fully and fairly address all the issues surrounding the 
altered exhibit as implicitly required by this Court's temporary 
remand Order -- thereby frustrating the judicial process by its 
5 
failure to fully and fairly resolve the matters before it pertaining 
to the altered exhibit. The claim that the trial court failed to 
comply with this Court Order is a conclusion of law, which is 
reviewed for correctness. See State v. Pena, 869 P. 2d 932, 939 (Utah 
1994). 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
The constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and 
regulations, whose interpretation is determinative, are set out 
verbatim, with the appropriate citation, in the body and arguments of 
the instant brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On or about June 22, 1994, Mr. Ronnie Earl Chambers, by way of 
Information, was charged with a zoning ordinance violation, a class 
B misdemeanor, which was amended to a class C misdemeanor, in 
violation of Weber County Zoning Ordinance 5-1 et seq., and a fire 
ordinance violation, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Weber 
County Fire Code Ordinance 11-1-1 et seg., and violation of the Utah 
Fire Code § 79.101 et seg., in relation to the subject property 
located at approximately 4425 East Highway 162 in Weber County. A 
bench trial was held before the District Court Judge Parley R. 
Baldwin on January 12 and 17, 1995. Upon conclusion of the bench 
trial, the trial court immediately found Defendant guilty on both 
counts. 
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At sentencing on April 20, 1995, the trial court, for the zoning 
violation, imposed a fine in the amount of $750.00 and 90 days in the 
Weber County Jail. The trial court suspended $500.00 of the fine and 
the 90 days in jail "on the condition that every ounce of that 
equipment is taken out of there within 30 days." For the fire code 
ordinance violation, the trial court again imposed a fine in the 
amount of $750.00 and 90 days in the Weber County Jail, which was 
suspended on the same condition as that on the zoning violation. 
The trial court signed its Judgment, Sentence (Commitment) on April 
20, 1998, which was entered that same day. Defendant filed Notice of 
Appeal on May 11, 1998. 
On appeal, Defendant, on January 9, 1996, filed a Motion to Stay 
Briefing Deadline Pending Temporary Remand to Trial Court for 
Determination Concerning Trial Exhibit. On January 29, 1996, this 
Court granted Defendant's Motion to Stay, temporarily remanding the 
case to the trial court for a determination as to the alleged exhibit 
tampering. Approximately one year later, the trial court's 
incomplete findings of fact and conclusions of law as to the altered 
exhibit issue were filed in this Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On or about June 22, 1994, Mr. Ronnie Earl Chambers, by way 
of Information, was charged with a zoning ordinance violation, a 
class B misdemeanor, in violation of Weber County Zoning Ordinance 5-
7 
1 et seq. ,x and a fire ordinance violation, a class B misdemeanor, in 
violation of Weber County Fire Code Ordinance 11-1-1 et seq. , and 
violation of the Utah Fire Code § 79.101 et seq.,2 in relation to the 
subject property located at approximately 4425 East Highway 162 in 
Weber County (R. 1-3, Information and Summons); 
2. A bench trial was held on the charges before the Honorable 
Parley R. Baldwin on September 12 and 17, 1995 (R. 60-330, Transcript 
of Trial) ; 
3. At trial, during the State's case-in-chief, Mr. Craig C. 
Barker, Director of the Weber County Planning Commission, testified 
as follows: 
MS. HURTADO: Mr. Barker, let me hand this to you. 
And do you recognize what this is? 
MR. BARKER: Yes, I do. 
MS. HURTADO: And what is it? 
*As to the alleged zoning ordinance violation in Count I of the 
Information, the State, in the Information, alleges that Mr. Ronnie 
Earl Chambers, between September 22, 1992, to June 22, 1994, violated 
the Weber County zoning ordinance by "keeping and maintaining a 
construction equipment yard located at approximately 4425 East 
Highway 162, in Weber County in an A-1 zone where a construction 
equipment yard is not a permitted nor a conditional use." (R. 1, 
Information). 
2In Count II of the Information, which is the alleged fire 
ordinance violation, the State alleges that between May 6, 1994, and 
June 22, 1994, Mr. Ronnie Earl Chambers violated the Weber County 
Fire Ordinance "by keeping and maintaining fuel tanks, located at 
approximately 4425 East Highway 162, in Weber County, in violation of 
the Uniform Fire Code, Article No. 79- [sic] Flammable and 
Combustible Liquids, as adopted by the Weber County Fire Code 




This is an enlargement of the property --
Weber County property plat for the property 
in question -- one of the properties shown 
on this plat. 
And does that accurately depict that area 




I believe it does, yes. 
Now, if you would, could you please stand 
and for the record note where the property 
in question is on this diagram? 
This property identified -- this is a 
partial number of the land serial number 
for the property which is noted here as 
0144. It says Ronnie Earl Chambers on it. 
MS. HURTADO: 
MR. BARKER: 
Mr. Storey -- Mr. Storey, I'm sorry. Mr. 
Barker, you are familiar with this map. 
Are you familiar with any changes that 
occurred in this map over the last ten 
years, for example, as far as ownership? 
Yes, I happened to review the property 
ownership books of prior years -- 1966, for 
example -- that we have on our -- in our 
office, and noted that the property is --
Mr. Chambers' property was not separated 
from the property noted on there as No. 
0027, at that time. It was all one parcel. 
(R. 76-77, Transcript of Trial); 
30n cross-examination, Mr. Barker admitted basing his ownership 
determination of the property in 1989 merely on the correspondence in 
his complaint file (R. 84-85, Transcript of Trial). In fact, when 
pressed about how he determined ownership of the property in 1989, 
Mr. Barker admitted that "there is another member of the planning 
commission who would - doing the complaints at the time may be able 
to better answer that than I." (Id. at 84, lines 16-25). 
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4. During the State's case-in-chief, Mr. Edward T. Reed, a 
former planning commission member on the Weber County Planning 















Noting this document [referring to 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 1], do you recognize 
this, that's on the wall? 
This document is an enlargement of -- it 
appears to be the official county 
recorder's plats. 
And can you identify the defendant's 
property on that? 
I can, yes. 
Will you just point to it? 
This is the defendant's property here. 
And what complaint was brought to your 
attention on this matter? 
That there was equipment parked on the 
property. 
And what was your action in response to 
that complaint? 
Reaction to that was to actually go up and 
look at the property and to see what was on 
the property. 
And what did you observe at that time? 
Based on my recollection -- and I have no 
documentation in the file -- that there was 
a front-end loader on the property, and I 
believe a pile of gravel. 
When are you referring to, as far as time? 
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MR. REED: I believe that was probably in 1989 when we 
received the complaint. 
MS. HURTADO: And who did you address that to at that 
time; do you recall? 
MR. REED: At that time I believe contact was made 
with Earl Chambers. 
(R. 87, lines 6-14, R. 88-89, Transcript of Trial); 
5. On cross-examination, Mr. Reed elicited the following 
testimony concerning ownership of the subject property: 
MR. ARNOLD: Now, you testified, did you not, that this 












Can you tell me what you base that decision 
on? 
Ronnie Chambers' property? 
Yes, 
I base it on the fact that that is a blowup 
of the county recorder's plats and Mr. 
Ronnie Earl Chambers' name is on it. 
When was that made? 
This particular plat, I couldn't tell you 
when it was made. 
Is it possible that Mr. Chambers could have 
conveyed that property since that time? 
That's a possibility. 
And is it possible that sometime between 
somebody writing Mr. Chambers' name on 
there and when you looked at it, he could 
have conveyed that property away, prior to 
that? 
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MR. REED: That's a possibility, I suppose. 
MR. ARNOLD: 
MR. REED: 
So, it's possible that he doesn't own the 
property then; isn't that correct? 
I have no knowledge whether he owns the 
property now or not. 
MR. ARNOLD: 
MR. REED: 
Or owned it when you looked at the map? 
Well, that's entirely possible. 
(R. 99-100, Transcript of Trial); 











And is there an investigation conducted as 
far as that observation you made on that 
complaint? 
Yes 
And what kind of investigation is that? 
What I would do is I would go back to the 
office, locate it on the maps that we have 
available, and that would include the 
county recorder's maps. And we would also 
secure the data that the county recorder 
has on file as to the ownership of the 
property. That would include the -- verify 
the name, that would give the address of 
the property owner. 
On this complaint in particular, did you do 
the normal investigation? 
I worked it up, yes; that's correct. 
So, at that time did you verify who was the 
owner? 
At that time, it was Mr. Chambers. 
And that was in 1992? 
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MR. REED: That's correct. 
(R. 101, Transcript of Trial); 
7. Mr. Reed testified to the following on recross examination: 
















-- you didn't verify who the owner was 
then; did you? 
As I recall, I believe I did, yes. 
How did you do that? 
I can do that by looking at the county 
recorder's plats and calling up the county 
recorder's office. 
Can you specifically recall the county 
recorder telling you that that was owned by 
Ronnie Chambers? 
As I -- that's going back quite a ways. 
But, yes, I believe that's correct. 
you remember that conversation? 
Not, you know, word for word of the 
conversation, no. 
Okay. Do you know what the county recorder 
looked at to verify that information? 
What they would look at is what --
No, do you know what he looked at -- or he 
looked at at that time? 
When I make a call, all I do -- what they 
do is they pull it up on their screen. 
MR. ARNOLD: On their computer screen? 
13 















Who did you talk to? 
I have -- I couldn't tell you, at the time. 
Couldn't remember who you talked to? 
No. 
Do you remember them pulling it up on their 
computer screen? 
Uh, no. All I did is call over and ask for 
a check on, you know, the ownership of the 
property. 
Okay. And you did that in 1989? 
As I recall, yes, I did. 
And you did it again in 1994? 
Two, x92 and x94. 
This particular map here says it's owned by 
two individuals; doesn't it? 
Well, I thought it said Ronnie Earl 
chambers. 
What were you told in the telephone 
conversation? 
MR. REED: I couldn't tell you that. 
MR. ARNOLD: You can't remember what you were told? 
MR. REED: No, I cannot remember that. 
So, you don't really recollect what you --
who you were told as being the owner, then? 
MR. REED: To tell you precisely, no, 
(R. 101-03, Transcript of Trial); 
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8. On further redirect examination, Mr. Reed testified as 
follows: 
MS. HURTADO: As part of your procedure, how do you 
document that you know who the owner of 
this is, as far as the complaint procedure? 
MR. REED: Well, as far as the complaint goes, I would 
look at the plat, and to verify, you know, 
who owns the property at the period of time 
I'm looking at the plat, I would call over 
to the county recorder's office. 
(R. 103-04, Transcript of Trial); 
9. In regard to Mr. Reed's prior testimony that he had 
confirmed ownership by Mr. Ronnie Earl Chambers of the property in 
1989 by looking at county recorder plats and by calling and speaking 
with the county recorder's office (see id. at R. 101-02), Mr. Reed 
testified to the following on further recross-examination: 
MR. ARNOLD: Just shortly, a few minutes ago, it was 
your testimony that you took these 
photographs in 1989; is that correct? 
MR. REED: That's correct. 
MR. ARNOLD: On the date so stated, May 23rd? 
MR. REED: That's correct. 
MR. ARNOLD: And it was your testimony that at that 
point in time you tried to determine who 
the property owner was and you looked at 
the plat map, call the county recorder's 
office, and as you recall, you were given 
the name Ronnie Chambers? 
MR. REED: Uh-huh. 
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MR. ARNOLD: If that were the case, Mr. Reed, why, then, 
would you direct this letter in June of x89 
to Mr. Storey, the supposed property owner? 
MR. REED: Because Mr. Storey was on the property 
plats as owner, he and his son, Eric. 
MR. ARNOLD: So, you didn't see Mr. Chambers on the 
property plat, then; did you? 
MR. REED: Not at this particular time, evidently. 
MR. ARNOLD: And evidently the recorder didn't tell you 
that Ronnie Chambers was the property 
owner; did she? 
MR. REED: That would be correct, based on this letter 
here. 
(R. 106-07, Transcript of Trial); 
10. During the State's case-in-chief, Ms. Yvonne E. Storey, a 
prior owner of the subject property, testified as follows: 
MS. STOREY: Okay, The property we've been discussing 
today, we didn't sell it. My son, Eric, 
had a home there and my husband, Boyd, 
decided to deed Eric some of that land, 
from our name to his name. And at that 
time we decided to deed about approximately 
an acre to Earl Chambers. Now, I say it 
was Earl because that's all I know. It 
might be -- I don't know what it says on 
the deed. But it was just my understanding 
that that acre was deeded to Earl Chambers. 
(R. Ill, lines 8-15, Transcript of Trial); 
11. During the State's case-in-chief, in the course of the 
direct examination of Mr. Glen E. Burton, the Chief of the Weber Fire 
District, and his testimony concerning the investigation of the 
16 
alleged fire ordinance violation, the following exchange took place 















Objection, Your Honor. That's hearsay. If 
he's going to tell what Earl said they're 
doing with the tanks, that's hearsay. 
That's not hearsay as it relates to the 
defendant. 
It's party opponent --
Excuse me? 
He's a defendant in this matter. 
That's not hearsay, when you're talking --
Excuse me, Earl Chambers is not a defendant 
in this matter, Your Honor. Ronnie 
Chambers is. 
Okay. Thank you for that distinction. 
Ronnie Earl Chambers -- There's a Ronnie 
Earl Chambers and an Earl Chambers; is that 
correct? 
Yes. Could we -- can we clarify which 
Chambers he's talking to? 
Yes, 
I was speaking of Earl Chambers, Ron's 
father. 
And he's not a defendant in this action, 
Your Honor, and I would object to that. 
Ms. Hurtado? 
He represented himself to be the owner of 
the property when he approached him. 
(R. 139-41, Transcript of Trial); 
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12. Upon the State resting its case, trial counsel for Mr. 
Ronnie Earl Chambers' moved to dismiss on the grounds that the State 
had failed to tie the charges to Defendant inasmuch as there had 
"been absolutely no testimony whatsoever" that Defendant was 
"conducting anything on that property . . ." and that there had been 
only "futile attempts to establish that he is the supposed property 
owner . . . ." (R. 162, lines 4-14, Transcript of Trial). The trial 
court denied the motion because, as the court stated, "The testimony 
has, in fact, been -- and is shown up there -- that that particular 
plat [Plaintiff's Exhibit 1] -- that can be challenged, clearly --
shows that the owner of this property is the defendant. As a result 
of that, the motion is denied at this point." (R. 162, lines 19-23, 
Transcript of Trial). In response, counsel argued the following: 
There's been no testimony . . . as to when that 
map was created. There is no testimony that 
that map was created during the periods of time 
that the allegation is made that [Defendant] 
made that offense. And I don't think the Court 
can rely upon that to attach criminal activity 
to my client. Simply that somebody has put his 
name on something that hasn't been established, 
a foundation or anything like that. 
(R. 163, Transcript of Trial); 
13. Upon conclusion of the bench trial, the trial court 
immediately found Defendant guilty on both counts (R. 327-29, lines 
11-14, R. Transcript of Trial); 
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14. In the course of its determination that Defendant violated 
the zoning ordinance, the trial court, as the basis for its ruling, 
stated: 
Some question had been raised about whether or 
not -- who owns this property. The prima facie 
standard was met when the plats were admitted from the 
county recorder's office showing the defendant owns 
that. There is a deed here in "91. The brother has 
testified that this is the other brother's property 
and he allows him on with that equipment. 
(R. 327, lines 5-10, Transcript of Trial); 
15. At sentencing on April 20, 1995, the trial court, for the 
zoning violation, imposed a fine in the amount of $750.00 and 90 days 
in the Weber County Jail. The trial court suspended $500.00 of the 
fine and the 90 days in jail "on the condition that every ounce of 
that equipment is taken out of there within 30 days." For the fire 
code ordinance violation, the trial court again imposed a fine in the 
amount of $750.00 and 90 days in the Weber County Jail, which was 
suspended on the same condition as that on the zoning violation 
(Transcript of Sentencing (April 20, 1995), pp. 5-6); 
16. The trial court signed its Judgment, Sentence (Commitment) 
on April 20, 1998, which was entered that same day (R. 34-35, 
Judgment, Sentence (Commitment))/ 
17. Defendant filed Notice of Appeal on May 11, 1998 (R. 37-38, 
Notice of Appeal); 
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18. On January 9, 1996, Defendant / Appellant filed a Motion to 
Stay Briefing Deadline Pending Temporary Remand to Trial Court For 
Determination Concerning Trial Exhibit; 
19. By Order dated January 29, 1996, this Court granted the 
Motion to Stay and temporarily remanded the case to the trial court 
for a determination as to the alleged exhibit tampering; 
20. Thereafter, by way of telephone, Ms. Monette Hurtado, 
Deputy Weber County Attorney, informed Defendant's appellate counsel 
that an employee at Kinko's, per her instructions prior to trial, had 
handwritten the name "Ronnie Earl Chambers" on the plat map utilized 
as Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 at trial (R. 345-46, letter to Ms. Monette 
Hurtado, dated February 13, 1996, and filed on February 20, 1996); 
21. By way of letter dated February 13, 1996, Defendant's 
appellate counsel requested that Ms. Hurtado provide further 
information concerning the circumstances surrounding the writing by 
the Kinko's employee on the plat map utilized as Plaintiff's Exhibit 
1 at trial {Id.); 
22. On or about February 14, 1996, Ms. Hurtado responded to the 
request for further information by refusing to provide any 
information by informal discovery concerning the writing by the 
Kinko's employee on the Exhibit prior to trial (R. 359, letter from 
Ms. Monette Hurtado to appellate counsel, dated February 14, 1996, 
attached to Motion For Continuance of Hearing as Attachment 2); 
20 
23. On February 23, 1996, Defendant / Appellant filed a Motion 
For Continuance of Hearing and a Motion For Discovery seeking 
information related to the determination of the exhibit tampering 
issue (R. 347-50, Motion For Discovery); 
24. After a hearing before the trial court on February 29, 
1996, the trial court granted the Motion For Discovery and required 
that Plaintiff, Weber County, respond to Defendant's request for 
discovery on or before March 29, 1996 (R. 365-66, Order); 
25. On or about March 27, 1996, Plaintiff, Weber County, by and 
through Deputy Weber County Attorney Monette Hurtado, responded by 
written answers to Defendant's discovery request (R. 368-72, Weber 
County's Response to Defendant's Discovery Request; R. 3 73, Discovery 
Certificate); 
26. Contrary to the representations made by Plaintiff through 
Ms. Hurtado prior to filing Weber County's responses, Weber County, 
through Deputy Weber County Attorney Monette Hurtado, responded to 
Defendant's discovery requests by identifying the handwriting on the 
plat map, i.e., Plaintiff's Exhibit 1, as her own writing (R. 368, 
Response of Weber County to Request No. 1 of Defendant's Motion For 
Discovery). Such writing was made on the Exhibit on the morning of 
January 12, 1995, prior to trial (R. 369, Response of Weber County to 
Request Nos. 3, 4, and 7 of Defendant's Motion For Discovery); 
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27. On June 26, 1996, the trial court signed its Findings, 
which were entered on July 10, 1996, and received by Defendant's 
counsel on July 12, 1996 (R. 374-76, Findings); 
28. On July 22, 1996, Defendant filed a Motion to Amend and 
Clarify Findings and a Memorandum in Support of the Motion to Amend 
and Clarify Findings (R. 377-85, Motion to Amend and Clarify Findings 
and Memorandum in Support of same) .4 In the Motion, Defendant 
specifically objected to various findings of the trial court, moved 
the trial court for additional findings concerning matters that the 
trial court failed to address based on the evidence before it, and 
requested further evidence by deposition concerning the circumstances 
surrounding the alteration to the Exhibit (R. 3 81-84, Memorandum in 
Support of Motion to Amend and Clarify Findings); 
29. On July 25, 1996, Defendant, through counsel, filed a 
Notice of Deposition (R. 386-87, Notice of Deposition) and on July 
26, 1996, served Ms. Hurtado with a Subpoena for the purpose of 
taking her deposition on August 13, 1996 (R. 388-90, Subpoena and 
Affidavit of Service); 
4Both of the July 22, 1996, date stamps on the Motion to Amend 
and Clarify Findings and the Memorandum in Support in the record, 
which were filed on July 22, 1996, have inexplicably been crossed out 
and date stamped as July 23, 1996. Appellate counsel, when filing 
these documents, obtained a date stamped copy of the same, which show 
that the documents were filed on July 22, 1996. 
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30. On August 2, 1996, Plaintiff, Weber County, through Ms. 
Hurtado, filed a Motion to Quash and Supporting Memorandum to Quash 
(R. 3 91-97, Motion to Quash and Supporting Memorandum); 
31. On August 13, 1996, Defendant, through counsel, filed 
another Notice of Deposition (R. 400-01, Notice of Deposition) and on 
August 13, 1996, served Ms. Hurtado with a Subpoena for the purpose 
of taking her deposition on August 23, 1996 (R. 388-90, Subpoena and 
Affidavit of Service); 
32. On August 14, 1996, Defendant filed a Rule 4-501 Notice to 
Submit for Decision, informing the trial court that the Motion to 
Amend and Clarify Findings, which was filed on July 22, 1996, and to 
which Plaintiff did not respond, was at issue and ready for decision 
by the court (R. 402-04, Rule 4-501 Notice to Submit For Decision); 
33. On August 16, 1996, Plaintiff, through Ms. Hurtado, filed 
a Motion to Quash and Supporting Memorandum to Quash (R. 4 05-07, 
Motion to Quash and Supporting Memorandum); 
34. On August 16, 1996, Plaintiff, through Ms. Hurtado, mailed 
a copy of the proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and 
Order to appellate counsel (R. 413, Certificate of Mailing); 
35. On August 22, 1996, the trial court quashed the subpoena 
served on Ms. Hurtado on July 26, 1996 (R. 417-18, Order Granting 
Weber County's Motion to Quash); 
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36. On August 28, 1996, Defendant filed his Response in 
Opposition to Motion to Quash (R. 421-26, Response of Defendant in 
Opposition to Motion to Quash); 
37. On August 28, 1996, Defendant, through counsel, filed an 
Objection to Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and 
Order, in which Defendant incorporated his Motion to Amend and 
Clarify Findings previously filed on July 22, 1996 (R. 427-29, 
Objection to Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and 
Order); 
38. Without any reference or ruling on the pending Motion to 
Amend and Clarify Findings, the trial court, on August 28, 1996, 
signed the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order (R. 4 08-
13, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order); 
39. On several subsequent occasions, appellate counsel 
contacted and spoke with both the clerk's office, and at least on one 
occasion spoke with the trial court's clerk concerning the trial 
court's rulings on the pending Motions; 
40. Almost sixteen months later, on December 26, 1997, the Utah 
Court of Appeals received the trial court's Findings and Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and Order signed by the trial court on August 28, 
1996. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The State's evidence at trial was insufficient to 
establish, as an integral element of the charged crimes, Defendant's 
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ownership of the subject property beyond a reasonable doubt inasmuch 
as the State all but completely failed, among other things, to prove 
ownership of the property by Defendant during the time period alleged 
in the Information. Moreover, the Trial Court erred in its 
determination, both in its denial of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss 
and in its ruling, that the State had proved Defendant's ownership of 
the property as an element of the crimes charged beyond a reasonable 
doubt and thereby denied Defendant of his constitutional right to due 
process. 
2. By refusing to rule on the pending motions, the trial court 
not only failed to fully and fairly address all the issues 
surrounding the altered exhibit as implicitly required by this 
Court's order concerning temporary remand, but it frustrated the 
judicial process by its failure to fully and fairly resolve the 
matters before it pertaining to the altered exhibit. 
ARGUMENTS 
I. THE STATE'S EVIDENCE AT TRIAL WAS INSUFFICIENT TO 
ESTABLISH, AS AN INTEGRAL ELEMENT OF THE CHARGED 
CRIMES, DEFENDANT'S OWNERSHIP OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY 
BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT INASMUCH AS THE STATE ALL 
BUT COMPLETELY FAILED, AMONG OTHER THINGS, TO PROVE 
OWNERSHIP OF THE PROPERTY BY DEFENDANT DURING THE TIME 
PERIOD ALLEGED IN THE INFORMATION. 
a) The Trial Court erred in its determination that 
the State had proved Defendant's ownership of 
the property as an element of the crimes charged 
beyond a reasonable doubt and thereby denied 
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Defendant of his constitutional right to due 
process. 
When reviewing a claim of insufficiency of the evidence in a 
bench trial, the appellate court applies the "clearly erroneous" 
standard, "which requires that xif the findings (or the trial court's 
verdict in a criminal case) are against the clear weight of the 
evidence, or if the appellate court otherwise reaches a definite and 
firm conviction that a mistake has been made, the findings (or 
verdict) will be set aside.'" State v. Featherson, 781 P. 2d 424, 
431-32 (Utah 1989) (quoting State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 
1987)); Provo City Corp. v. Spotts, 861 P.2 437 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
The appellate court will not disturb the findings unless they are 
clearly erroneous." Featherson, 781 P. 2d at 432 (citing Lemon v. 
Coates, 735 P.2d 58, 60 (Utah 1987)). In addition, the appellate 
court gives due regard to the opportunity of the "trial court to 
judge the credibility of the witnesses." Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a) (made 
applicable to criminal cases by virtue of Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-
26(7)) . 
"A fundamental precept of our criminal law is that the State 
must prove all elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt." State 
v. Starks, 627 P.2d 88, 92 (Utah 1981) (citing State v. Torres, 619 
P.2d 694 (Utah 1980)). Moreover, "it has long been assumed that 
proof of a criminal charge beyond a reasonable doubt is 
constitutionally required." In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 362, 90 
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S.Ct. 1068, 1071 (1970). "It is the duty of the Government to 
establish . . . guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. This notion --
basic in our law and rightly one of the boasts of a free society --
is a requirement and a safeguard of due process of law in the 
historic, procedural content of 'due process.'" Leland v. Oregon, 343 
U.S. 790, 802-03, 72 S.Ct. 1002, 1009 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., 
dissenting); see also Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 210, 97 
S.Ct. 2319, 2327 (1977) ("the Due Process Clause requires the 
prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt all of the elements 
included in the definition of the offense of which the defendant is 
charged").5 
The standard of evidence of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt 
plays a vital role in the American scheme of criminal procedure. In 
re Winship, 397 U.S. at 363, 90 S.Ct. at 1072. "It is a prime 
instrument for reducing the risk of convictions resting on factual 
error. The standard provides concrete substance for the presumption 
of innocence -- that bedrock 'axiomatic and elementary' principle 
5According to well-settled United States Supreme Court case law, 
the requirement that the State prove all elements beyond a reasonable 
doubt, together with its surrounding rules of evidence, "developed to 
safeguard men [and women] from dubious and unjust convictions, with 
resulting forfeitures of life, liberty and property." Brinegar v. 
United States, 338 U.S. 160, 174, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 1310 (1949). In 
fact, "the requirement [of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt] is 
implicit in 'constitutions . . . [which] recognize the fundamental 
principles that are deemed essential for the protection of life and 
liberty.'" In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 362, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1072 
(1970) (quoting Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469, 488, 16 S.Ct. 
353, 358 (1895)) . 
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whose 'enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of 
our criminal law.'" Id. (quoting Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 
432, 453, 15 S.Ct. 394, 403 (1895)). 
As a matter of well-settled law, "circumstantial evidence alone 
may be sufficient to establish the guilt of the accused." State v. 
Nickles, 728 P.2d 123, 126 (Utah 1986). Circumstantial evidence is 
sufficient to convict "if it is of 'such quality and quantity as to 
justify a [a determination of] guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.'" 
State v. Span, 819 P.2d 329, 332 (Utah 1991) (quoting Nickles, 728 
P.2d at 127). Moreover, "[c]riminal convictions cannot rest on 
conjecture or supposition; they must be established by proof beyond 
a reasonable doubt." See Workman, 852 P.2d at 987 (noting that the 
State's argument that "speculative inferences can constitute proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt is to attack one of the most sacred 
constitutional safeguards at its core"). 
When challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, a 
"
x
 [d] ef endant has the burden of marshaling all the evidence that 
supports the verdict, and then showing that, when viewed in the light 
most favorable to the verdict, the evidence is insufficient.'" State 
v. Hayes, 860 P.2d 968, 972 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (quoting State v. 
Vigil, 840 P.2d 788, 793 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), cert, denied, 857 P.2d 
948 (Utah 1993)). Notwithstanding, the appellate court has the 
ultimate power to conduct an independent review of constitutional 
claims such as the issue in this case concerning the State's failure 
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to prove all of the elements of the crimes charged beyond a 
reasonable doubt as required by the constitutional right to due 
process. See State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1266 (Utah 1993). 
The State, in the case at bar, charged Defendant by way of 
Information with a zoning ordinance violation allegedly in violation 
of Weber County Zoning Ordinance 5-1 et seg., and a fire ordinance 
violation allegedly in violation of Weber County Fire Code Ordinance 
11-1-1 et seg., and the Utah Fire Code § 79.101 et seg. (R. 1-3, 
Information). The alleged violations occurred on the subject 
property located at approximately 4425 East Highway 162 in Weber 
County between September 22, 1992, and June 22, 1994 (Count I), and 
May 6, 1994, and June 22, 1994 (Count II), respectively {Id.). An 
integral element of the crimes charged against Defendant is ownership 
of the property in question. 
Even when the evidence presented by the State during its case-
in-chief, as set forth verbatim in the Statement of Facts above (see 
Statement of Facts, H^ f3-11) , is viewed in a light most favorable to 
the trial court's ruling,6 the evidence is wholly insufficient to 
establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, Defendant's ownership of the 
property during the alleged time periods in the Information. In the 
State's case-in-chief, in the course of presenting Plaintiff's 
6The trial court, as the record indicates, did not enter any 
written findings of fact in support of its ruling. Moreover, the 
transcript of the trial court's ruling is essentially devoid of any 
verbal findings of fact in support of its ruling. 
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Exhibit 1, the State failed to make the foundational showing 
necessary to authenticate the Exhibit as an accurate plat map from 
the Weber County Recorder's Office. In so doing, the State failed 
to prove ownership by Defendant of the subject property during the 
alleged time periods attendant to the charged crimes. 
In the course of Mr. Barker's testimony as Director of the Weber 
County Planning Commission during the State's case-in-chief, Mr. 
Barker referred to and utilized Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 to establish 
ownership by Defendant of the property (R. 76-77, Transcript of 
Trial). Mr. Barker's testimony further indicates that he utilized 
ownership books from his own office rather than those from the Weber 
County Recorder's Office to research ownership of the property {Id.). 
On cross-examination, Mr. Barker admitted, in contradiction to his 
prior testimony, that he actually utilized the correspondence in his 
file to determine ownership of the property (see id. at R. 84-85), 
that there was another person in his office more qualified to answer 
questions concerning ownership of the property (see id. at R. 84, 
lines 22-24), and that he did not recall a property plat (see id. at 
R. 84, lines 21-22). 
During its case-in-chief, the State, in the course of testimony 
by Mr. Edward T. Reed, a former Weber County Planning Commission 
member, attempted to establish Defendant's ownership of the subject 
property by having Mr. Reed refer to Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 (Id. at R. 
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87, lines 6-14).7 Again, the State failed to establish any 
foundational accuracy as to the alleged plat map utilized as 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 1. In addition, the State failed to make any 
showing by someone at least familiar with the preparation of the plat 
map in the Weber County Recorder's Office to establish that indeed 
the exhibit accurately represented the status of property ownership 
as depicted by the plat. Further, even if one were to assume that 
the plat accurately reflected the status of property ownership, which 
under the circumstances of the evidence presented at trial is a leap, 
the State also failed to make the requisite showing to establish the 
time period of property ownership represented by the plat map. See 
State v. Harman, 767 P. 2d 567, 568 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (stating that 
the appellate court "will not make 'speculative leap[s] across . . . 
remaining gap[s]' in the evidence") (quoting State v. Petree, 659 
P.2d 443, 445 (Utah 1983)). 
The State's utilization of Plaintiff's Exhibit 1, during its 
case-in-chief, to establish Defendant's ownership of the subject 
property is especially troubling in light of the fact that 
70n cross-examination, Mr. Reed admitted that he based his 
determination concerning Defendant's ownership of the property on 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 (see R. 99, lines 5-13, Transcript of Trial). 
When asked when Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 was made, Mr. Reed responded 
that he "couldn't tell [Defendant's counsel] when it was made." (See 
id. at R. 99, lines 14-16). In fact, upon further cross-examination, 
Mr. Reed admitted that, precisely speaking, he actually didn't 
remember in the course of his investigation who he was told as being 
the owner of the property (Id. at R. 102-03). 
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Plaintiff's counsel, Deputy Weber County Attorney Hurtado, hand-wrote 
the name "Ronnie Earl Chambers" on Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 prior to 
trial on the morning of January 12, 1995 (R. 3 69, Response of Weber 
County to Request Nos. 3, 4, and 7 of Defendant's Motion For 
Discovery; see also Statement of Facts, f 1(20-26) -8 Equally troubling, 
is the failure by Deputy Weber County Attorney Hurtado, as 
Plaintiff's counsel, to inform either the trial court or opposing 
counsel of her alteration or enhancement to the trial exhibit prior 
to offering Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 and referring to the Exhibit as 
evidence at trial. This fact alone, underscores the failure by the 
prosecution to prove every element of the crimes charged beyond a 
reasonable doubt. See Harman, 161 P.2d at 568 ("Every element of the 
crime [s] charged must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. If the 
evidence does not support those elements, the verdict must fail."). 
Also during the State's case-in-chief, in the course of 
eliciting testimony by M2. Yvonne E. Storey, a prior owner of the 
subject property, testified that, according to her understanding, the 
subject property had been "deeded" to Mr. Earl Chambers, Defendant's 
father (See R. Ill, Transcript of Trial). This testimony is 
8Ms. Hurtado's alteration or enhancement of Plaintiff's Exhibit 
1 is exacerbated by the fact that she, in response to requests 
concerning the altered exhibit, initially represented that a Kinko's 
employee, per her instructions, had handwritten the name "Ronnie Earl 
Chambers" on the plat map utilized as Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 at trial 
(see R. 345-46, letter from appellate counsel to Deputy Weber County 
Attorney Hurtado, dated February 13, 1996, and filed on February 20, 
1996). 
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indicative of the confusion that existed at trial, both on the part 
of the prosecution and the trial court, concerning the crucial 
distinction to be made between the identity of Defendant, Ronnie Earl 
Chambers, and his father, Earl Chambers (see, e.g., R. 139-41, 
Transcript of Trial; see also Statement of Facts Ull).9 As evinced 
by the foregoing evidence presented at trial, there existed at least 
a hypothesis that someone other than Defendant owned the subject 
property. The evidence at trial also supports the existence of the 
hypothesis that even if one were to assume that Defendant did own the 
subject property, that he did not own the property during the time 
periods alleged in the Information. The existence of these 
hypotheses necessarily raises a reasonable doubt as to Defendant's 
guilt. Therefore, the evidence is insufficient to support 
Defendant's convictions. See State v. Hill, 727 P.2d 221, 222 (Utah 
1986); see Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501.10 
9See Plaintiff's Exhibit 14 (Letter dated June 16, 1994, from Mr. 
Glen H. Burton, Weber District Fire Chief, to Deputy County Attorney 
Hurtado, a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto as 
Addenda C), in which Mr. Burton represents to Ms. Hurtado that the 
subject property "is a construction equipment storage site owned by 
Earl Chambers." Mr. Earl Chambers is Defendant's father. 
10Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501 provides, in relevant part: 
(1) A defendant in a criminal proceeding is 
presumed to be innocent until each element of 
the offense charged against him is proved beyond 
a reasonable doubt. In absence of such proof, 
the defendant shall be acquitted. 
(2) As used in this part the words "elements 
of the offense" mean: 
(a) The conduct, attendant 
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As can be see from a review of the evidence at trial, the 
evidence is insufficient to support Defendant's convictions inasmuch 
as the evidence, or essentially the total lack thereof, leads to a 
definite and firm conviction that a mistake was made by the trial 
court. Reversal for insufficiency of the evidence is therefore 
appropriate in the instant case. 
b) The Trial Court, in the course denying 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss after the State 
rested its case and in the course of its ruling, 
erred in its determination that the State had 
proved Defendant's ownership of the property as 
an element of the crimes charged beyond a 
reasonable doubt -- thereby denying Defendant of 
his constitutional right to due process. 
The appellate court has the ultimate power to conduct an 
independent review of constitutional claims such as the issue in this 
case concerning the standard of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt as 
required by the constitutional right to due process. See State v. 
Thurman, 846 P. 2d 1256, 1266 (Utah 1993) . Although considerable 
deference is accorded to factual findings, the trial court's 
conclusion of law that ownership by Defendant of the subject property 
was proven beyond a reasonable doubt is given no special deference 
circumstances, or results of conduct 
proscribed, prohibited, or forbidden 
in the definition of the offense; or 
(b) The culpable mental state 
required. 
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and thus reviewed for correctness. See State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 
939 (Utah 1994) . 
Upon the State resting its case, Defendant's trial counsel moved 
to dismiss on the grounds that the State had failed to tie the 
charges to Defendant inasmuch as there had "been absolutely no 
testimony whatsoever" that Defendant was "conducting anything on that 
property . . ." and that there had been only "futile attempts to 
establish that he is the supposed property owner . . . ." (R. 162, 
lines 4-14, Transcript of Trial). The trial court denied the motion, 
stating, "The testimony has, in fact, been -- and is shown up there 
-- that that particular plat [Plaintiff's Exhibit 1] -- that can be 
challenged, clearly -- shows that the owner of this property is the 
defendant. As a result of that, the motion is denied at this point." 
(R. 162, lines 19-23, Transcript of Trial). In response, Defendant's 
trial counsel argued that 
There's been no testimony . . . as to when that 
map was created. There is no testimony that 
that map was created during the periods of time 
that the allegation is made that [Defendant] 
made that offense. And I don't think the Court 
can rely upon that to attach criminal activity 
to my client. Simply that somebody has put his 
name on something that hasn't been established, 
a foundation or anything like that. 
(R. 163, Transcript of Trial). Further, in the course of its 
determination that Defendant violated the zoning ordinance, the trial 
court, as the basis for its ruling, stated: 
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Some question had been raised about whether or 
not -- who owns this property. The prima facie 
standard was met when the plats were admitted from the 
county recorder's office showing the defendant owns 
that. There is a deed here in '91. The brother has 
testified that this is the other brother's property 
and he allows him on with that equipment.11 
(R. 327, lines 5-10, Transcript of Trial) (Emphasis added). 
By determining, in the course of its foregoing rulings, that the 
State had proven Defendant's ownership of the subject property beyond 
a reasonable doubt, the trial court denied Defendant of his 
constitutional right to due process. 
II. BY REFUSING TO RULE ON THE PENDING MOTIONS, THE TRIAL 
COURT NOT ONLY FAILED TO FULLY AND FAIRLY ADDRESS ALL 
THE ISSUES SURROUNDING THE ALTERED EXHIBIT AS 
IMPLICITLY REQUIRED BY THIS COURT'S ORDER CONCERNING 
TEMPORARY REMAND, BUT IT FRUSTRATED THE JUDICIAL 
PROCESS BY ITS FAILURE TO FULLY AND FAIRLY RESOLVE THE 
MATTERS BEFORE IT PERTAINING TO THE ALTERED EXHIBIT. 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52(b), in relevant part, provides 
that " [u]pon motion of a party made not later than 10 days after 
lxDuring the cross-examination of Defendant's witness, Mr. Greg 
Chambers, Defendant's brother, the prosecution, inappropriately and 
beyond the scope of direct examination, presented, over the objection 
of Defendant's counsel, Plaintiff's Exhibit 16, which is apparently 
a Quit-Claim Deed from Mr. Eric B. Storey to Mr. Ronnie Earl 
Chambers, dated March 20, 1998, and recorded that same day (R. 286-
87, Transcript of Trial; see a true and correct copy of Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 16 (Quit-Claim Deed) , attached hereto as Addenda D) . 
Notwithstanding, the State failed to establish that the legal 
description on the Deed is in fact the same property as that of the 
subject property. Further, even if one were to assume that it was 
the same property, the State again failed to establish the period of 
time of Defendant's ownership of the property. 
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entry of judgment the court may amend its findings or make additional 
findings and may amend the judgment accordingly." Rule 52(b) is made 
applicable to criminal proceedings by Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 
81(e), which provides that "[t]hese rules of procedure shall also 
govern in any aspect of criminal proceedings where there is not other 
applicable statute or rule. . . . " See State v. Goodman, 763 P.2d 
786 (Utah 1988) . 
In the Motion to Amend and Clarify Findings filed on July 22, 
1996, Defendant specifically objected to the trial court's finding 
that "No objections where [sic] raised by the defendant either to the 
introduction, use or acceptance [of Plaintiff's Exhibit 1]." Rather, 
the record indicates that Defendant's trial counsel moved to dismiss 
and objected to the trial court's reliance on Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 
for lack of foundation and other reasons, which the trial court 
overruled (See R. 162-63, Transcript of Trial, pp. 103-04) . 
Defendant, by way of his Motion to Amend and Clarify Findings, 
also objected to the trial court's finding that " [b]ecause the 
attorney [i.e., Deputy Weber County Attorney Monette Hurtado] felt 
that it may be difficult to see the names on the map [i.e., 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 1] at a distance, she traced over the letters in 
ink." To the contrary, Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 evinces that Ms. 
Hurtado did not, in fact, trace over letters on the plat map. 
Rather, new and different letters were handwritten in on the plat 
map, which was utilized by Plaintiff's counsel as Plaintiff's Exhibit 
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1 at trial. Such a finding by the trial court is against the clear 
weight of evidence shown by the blown up copy of the plat map. 
Further, by way of his Motion to Amend and Clarify Findings, and 
based on grounds previously cited, Defendant objected to and 
challenged the trial court's conclusion that "the exhibit was not 
tampered with, that any enhancements to the poster [Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 1] took place prior to the exhibit being offered and then 
inspected by the attorney for the defendant, and that no objection 
was raised on the acceptance of the exhibit." 
Additionally, the trial court neglected to make any findings 
addressing Plaintiff's counsel's initial representation to 
Defendant's appellate counsel that a Kinko's employee, per the 
instructions of Plaintiff's counsel, handwrote the new matter on the 
Exhibit. The trial court also failed to make any findings as to the 
failure of Plaintiff's counsel to inform either the trial court or 
Defendant's trial counsel of the alteration to Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 
prior to offering the same as an exhibit at trial. 
The trial court failed to rule of Defendant's Motion to Amend 
and Clarify Findings and his Objection to the proposed Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order, which incorporated the Motion 
to Amend and Clarify Findings filed on July 22, 1996. By so doing, 
the trial court failed to completely address the issues related to 
the alteration of the Exhibit as Ordered by this Court on January 29, 
1996. As a result, the trial court frustrated the judicial process 
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and failed to comply with this Court's Order concerning temporary 
remand. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Mr. Ronnie Earl Chambers respectfully 
requests that this Court reverse his convictions and remand the case 
for further proceedings consistent with this Court's instructions as 
stated in its opinion. 
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT 
METHOD OF DISPOSITION. RETAINING JURISDICTION 
Defendant requests oral argument because oral argument will 
materially enhance the decisional process due to the significant and 
novel issues in the instant appeal dealing with the constitutional 
right to due process by requiring the State to prove all elements of 
the charged crimes beyond a reasonable doubt, which, based on the 
facts of the instant appeal, involve issues requiring further 
development in these areas of criminal law for the benefit of bar and 
public. Counsel for Defendant further requests that the method of 
disposition of the instant appeal be by opinion designated by the 
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Court "For Official Publication" for purposes of precedential value 
and direction in future cases. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this j^ ffi day of July, 1998. 
ARNOTJD\& WIGGINS, P.C. 
^^ S-eetfer L W^ggi ns 
AttorneysTor Appellant 
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Ms. Monette Hurtado 
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2380 Washington Blvd. #230 







Addenda A: Judgment, Sentence (Commitment) - entered April 20, 
1995 
Addenda B: Copy of Altered Portion of Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 (as 
altered by Deputy County Attorney Hurtado) 
Addenda C: Copy of Plaintiff's Exhibit 14 - Letter (dated June 
16, 1994) from Glen H. Burton, Chief of the Weber Fire 
District, to Deputy Weber County Attorney Hurtado) 
Addenda D: Copy of Plaintiff's Exhibit 16 - Quit-Claim Deed 
42 
Addendum A 
SECOND CIRCUIT COURT- OGDEN 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH JUDGMENT, SENTENCE 
VS (COMMITMENT) 
CHAMBERS, RONNIE EARL CASE NO: 941002275 
3352 E 3350 N DOB: / / 
EDEN UT 84310 TAPE: B57 COUNT: 5445 
DATE: 04/20/95 
CITATION: , 
THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANT BEING ADJUDGED GUILTY FOR THE 
OFFENSE(S) AS FOLLOWS: 
Charge: 5-1.1 ZONING VIOL 
Plea: Find: Guilty - Bench 
Fine: 750.00 Susp: 0.00 
Jail: 90 DA Susp: 90 DA ACS: 0 
Charge: UFC-79-103 FLAMMABLE LIQUID STORAGE 
Plea: Find: Guilty - Bench 
Fine: 750.00 Susp: 0.00 
Jail: 90 DA Susp: 90 DA ACS: 0 
FEES AND ASSESSMENTS: 
Fine Description: Fine- Prosecutor Spl 
Credit: 0.00 Paid: 0.00 Due: 1,500.00 
TOTAL FINES AND ASSESMENTS: 
Credit: 0.00 Paid: 0.00 Due: 1,500.00 
CALENDAR: 
SENTENCING 04/20/95 09:00 AM in rm 2 with PARLEY R. BALDWIN 
OS-
CHAMBERS, RONNIE EARL CASE NO: 941002275 PAGE 2 
DOCKET INFORMATION: 
Sentence: 
Deft present with Counsel, Prosecutor present 
ATD: ARNOLD, MARK E. PRO: HURTADO, M 
Tape: B57 Count: 5445 





Jail: 90 DAYS 
STORE FLAM LQUD 
Fine Amount: 
Jail: 90 DAYS 
Guilty - Be 
.00 




Suspended: 90 DAYS 
Plea: Find 
750.00 Suspended: 
Suspended: 90 DAYS 
$1,000 FINE SUSPENDED WITH DEF'S COMPLIANCE WITH THE ORDINANCES 
WITHIN 30 DAYS. DEF TO APPEAR ON 5-18-95 WITH FINE PAID AND 
PROPERTY CLEANED UP 
DEF'S CONVICTION IS ENTERED 
fa THExi COURT 
- ^ . ' 
JUDGE, CIRCUIT COURT 
NOTE: APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITHIN 3 0 DAYS 
OF ENTRY OF THIS JUDGMENT. 




F E B - 4 1998 
COURT OF APPALS 
FILED 
Utah Court of Appeals 
NOV 1 h 1995 
Marilyn M. Branch 
Clerk of the Court 
•tiir.ti-.iKi', ljM;M''i-IU' 




WEBER FIRE DISTRICT 
1871 NORTH 1350 WEST 
OGDEN, UTAH 84404 
782-3580 
JON 1 P, 1CQ4 
June 16, 1994 
Monette Hurtado 
County Attorney's Office 
2549 Washington Blvd. 
OgdeaTTT 84401 
BOARD OF TRUSI t:FS 
SCOTT W. HADLEY 




DENNIS MONTGOMB ;,' v 
HUNTSVILLE REP. 
WEST HAVEN REP 
ADMINISTRATION 
GLEN BURTON - CHIEF 
DAVID AUSTIN - ASST CI /!• 
Dear Ms. Hurtado: 
On May 6, 1994, Ed Reed and 1 inspected the property at HWY #162 at approximately 3100 East. 
This site is a construction equipment storage site owned by Earl Chambers. 
At the request of the County Commissioners, I have IKUL observing the site over the past few 
months. Attention was aimed specifically at the above ground fuel storage tanks My previous 
inspections had indicated that the fuel tanks were empty and not being used. 
During a drive by in April I noticed a fuel pump had been placed and appeared to be in use. On 
my inspection on May 6th, T noled the tanks were piped and fitted to the pump lor use. A 
discussion with Earl Chambers confirmed the use and he admitted the contents of the tank were 
diesel fuel. I indicated to Mr. Chambers that the tanks were not approved for use and that he 
should remove the tanks as soon as possible. 
The fuel tanks located at the Chambers site do not comply with the Uniform Fire Code, Article 
#79 - Flammable and Combustible Liquids. 
If I can be of further assistance, please feel free to call me. 
Sincerely, 
WEBER FIRE DISTRICT 
^ < (-6^\^ ' I i .J^l-tsl/lf-. 
Glen H. Burton 
Chief- Administrator 
GHBrldp 
Hty n MaintiH \A 
I Date Received .... - J u———-
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